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Who Drives Diaspora Development?
Replication of Mexico’s 3×1 Program in Yucatán
Aaron Malone
University of Colorado Boulder
T. Elizabeth Durden
Bucknell University

Abstract

Migration and remittances are increasingly
central to development plans and the search
for best practices has driven convergence
of diaspora development policies. Mexico
is often considered a model, particularly
its Tres Por Uno or 3×1 Program that offers
matching grants to encourage migrant organizations to sponsor development projects
in their origin communities. We employ a
policy mobilities framework to ask how this
program has been positioned as a model
and exported from its original contexts.
With replication in other high emigration
countries possible, we examine internal replication within Mexico to evaluate the model’s
possible external relevance. We focus on
its re-grounding in Yucatán, a new sending
state with low intensity and short history of
migration by Mexican standards. Despite
the non-traditional context, the state has
rapidly embraced the migrant-centered 3×1
Program. We find that the program initially
followed expectations in Yucatán, but within
a few years devolved into a pattern of “simulation”/aval projects that are controlled by
municipal officials and minimize migrant
involvement. Without effective counter-pressures from migrant organizations, corruption

and clientelism became common. We conclude that implementation in a very distinct
context mainstreamed and normalized problems that had been present but marginal in
the original contexts.

Keywords: transnationalism, development,
policy mobilities, Mexico

Resumen

La migración y las remesas son temas cada
vez más centrales en planes de desarrollo que,
en búsqueda de modelos exitosos, propician
la convergencia de varias políticas de desarrollo que tratan el tema de la diáspora. México
suele ser considerado como un modelo al respecto debido a programas como el llamado
Tres Por Uno o 3×1, el cual ofrece subsidios
combinados a organizaciones de migrantes
que adelantan proyectos de desarrollo en sus
comunidades de origen. Empleando el marco
analítico de políticas de movilidad, preguntamos cómo este programa mexicano se ha
posicionado como modelo y ha sido exportado a otros contextos nacionales. Siendo
posible su replicación en otros países de alta
emigración, examinamos la replicación del
3×1 dentro de México evaluando la posible
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relevancia externa del modelo. Nuestro argumento gira en torno a su rediseño en Yucatán,
un nuevo estado emisor con baja intensidad y corta historia de migración según los
estándares mexicanos que ha adoptado rápidamente el programa 3×1. Encontramos que
allí el programa inicialmente cumplió con
las expectativas pero al cabo de unos pocos
años generó patrones de “simulación”/aval
controlados por funcionarios municipales
con mínima participación de los migrantes.
Ante la ausencia de participación efectiva
de organizaciones de migrantes, la corrupción y el clientelismo se volvieron comunes.
Concluimos que su implementación en un
entorno muy distinto al original amplificó
y normalizó problemas que habían estado
presentes pero marginales en los contextos
iniciales del 3×1.

remittances surpassed petroleum as Mexico’s
leading source of foreign exchange, drawing still greater attention to their economic
centrality (Esteves, 2016). The value of remittances continues to grow although migration
from Mexico has slowed, demonstrating
the durability of this transfer pattern and
quashing any doubts about its continued
importance, at least in the short to medium
term (Orozco, 2017).
Increasingly, origin countries see remittances as more than just an individual transfer
of money from a migrant to his or her family,
but rather as a development strategy for
an entire nation. Governments attempt to
leverage their diasporas as development
resources by implementing policies to bolster
transnational ties and encourage migrants’
contributions not only to their families but
also to infrastructure and other community
Palabras clave: transnacionalismo,
projects (Portes & Fernandez-Kelly, 2015).
desarrollo, movilidades de políticas públicas, Mexico has formalized efforts to maintain
México
the flow of remittances through its innovative
Tres Por Uno, or 3×1 Program for Migrants.
The program is a form of public-private partIntroduction
nership between the Mexican government
In recent decades, origin country govern- and U.S.-based hometown associations
ments have shown increased interest in (HTAs), which are clubs of migrants from
migration as remittances become central to a common origin that typically engage in
less developed nations’ economies (Bakker, philanthropy, mutual support, and cultural
2015). By the mid-1990s, remittances to or recreational activities. The 3×1 Program
developing countries surpassed official devel- incentivizes HTA contributions for comopment aid, and by 2015 remittances were munity projects, referred to as collective
triple the value of aid (World Bank, 2015). remittances, by offering matching funds from
Even in Mexico, a country with more than a federal, state, and municipal governments,
century of notable and sustained migration creating a three-to-one match that gives
history, remittances have garnered increased the program its name. Common projects
attention in recent years as volumes grow include building infrastructure such as roads,
and data improves. For the first time in 2015, water, sewer, and electricity in migrants’
140
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hometowns, as well as educational, cultural,
sports, and health projects.
The 3×1 Program is hailed as a policy
model whose relevance is not limited to
the contexts in which it emerged, but rather
extends throughout Mexico and beyond.
The remittance strategy is commonly cited
in discussions of global diaspora or migration-linked development policy (e.g. Orozco,
2013; McKenzie & Yang, 2015), various foreign governments have sent study teams to
see the program in action, and its visibility has been boosted by involvement from
international organizations, including the
World Bank, USAID, and the Inter-American
Development Bank (Iskander, 2010).
The first expansion of the model took it
from its informal origins among migrants
from the traditional migrant origin regions
in central Mexico, to formalization as the
3×1 Program, to expansion throughout the
country. Replication in other countries with
sizable numbers of migrants is possible, given
the program’s visibility and positioning as
a diaspora development best practice, yet
few studies have examined how the program
functions outside its original contexts. In
this paper we analyze the positioning of the
3×1 Program as a policy model by examining
empirical evidence from its most significant
replication to date —the internal replication
created by institutionalizing it as a federal
program throughout Mexico.
We examine the expansion of the model in
Yucatán, one of the three states of the Yucatán
Peninsula in southeastern Mexico. Yucatán
has only recently been incorporated into the
country’s migratory tradition as one of the
“new sending areas” of Mexican migrants

to the United States. For a new emigration
area, Yucatán has been remarkably active
in the migrant-driven 3×1 Program. Many
new Yucatecan hometown associations have
been formed and more than a hundred rural
villages have benefitted from 3×1 projects.
Yucatán’s total expenditures within the 3×1
Program are eleventh highest of Mexico’s
thirty-two states.
At first look, this rapid uptake of the
migrant-led development program appears
to be a success story. Upon closer examination, however, the growth — often in
municipalities with very low migration
intensity—raises questions about mutations
of the model and outright corruption. We
are left asking how well suited the 3×1 Program is to replication and implementation in
Yucatán. This paper examines 3×1 projects in
Yucatán to understand how place and context influence the application of the policy
model. This kind of comparative analysis
of implementation across multiple contexts
yields deeper insights about the policy itself,
which is of particular value in this case given
its status as an international model, as well as
allowing reflection on the process of policy
mobilization.
We use a policy mobilities framework to
explore the regrounding of the 3×1 Program
in Yucatán, after first reviewing the program’s
evolution in its original contexts in central
Mexico. This framework structures our analysis of whether and how replications duplicate
the documented benefits of pioneering
examples of the model, and when and why
replications in new contexts yield substantial
deviations or novel results.
Recent geographical research on policy
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mobilities centers on the concepts of policy
assemblages, mobilities, and mutations as
a way to explore the movement of policies
across space and place (e.g. Peck & Theodore, 2010; McCann & Ward, 2011, 2012;
Prince, 2012; Baker & Temenos, 2015). The
policy mobilities framework examines how
policies are assembled in specific places and
draw on local resources and contexts, how
they are mobilized and packaged, and how
they are mutated in the process of movement
and through application in new places. In
a globalized context of substantial policy
convergence, both in the urban realm that
has dominated policy mobilities research
and in migration and diaspora policy — an
inherently international field — it is imperative to understand how context shapes policy
development and its subsequent replication
in new places.

Literature Review
Migration and Development Nexus
Scholars have long debated whether migration is more likely to spur development in
origin areas and countries, or perpetuate
underdevelopment. Optimistic views have
dominated in some eras and pessimistic views in others (Faist, 2008; de Haas,
2012; Gamlen, 2014a). Optimism has been
resurgent since the late 1990s, amid growing recognition and better accounting of
the huge sums of money remitted by international migrants. Scholars and officials
increasingly see migrants as transnational
actors who can contribute and participate,
even from a distance (Levitt, 1998; Vertovec,
142

2009). This has been accompanied by a discursive shift away from narratives of migrants
as deserters and toward discourses of migrant
heroes — loyal and generous contributors
to the homeland (Durand, 2004). Origin
country governments and international organizations have rushed to embrace migrant
and diaspora populations and enact policies
to facilitate and encourage remittances and
investments, often converging on common
ideas and policies (Delano, 2014; Bakker,
2015; Price, 2017). A technocratic air pervades
the current optimism about migration as a
win-win process, with officials emphasizing
policy solutions and arguing that “migration benefits everyone as long as the policies
are right” (Gamlen, 2014b, p. 198, emphasis
added). This perspective acknowledges that
migration has not always benefitted origin
areas, but assumes that best practices exist
or can be developed to produce desired outcomes. We argue that to the extent migration
policy ignores context —both contexts from
which policies emerge and contexts in which
they are to be regrounded — these assumptions are problematic. A policy mobilities
lens can help correct this problem.
Mexico has been at the center of diaspora
development and migration policy trends,
particularly its famed 3×1 Program (Orozco,
2013; McKenzie & Yang, 2015). Mexico’s
posture toward emigrants and diaspora
has shifted seismically since the 1980s, and
especially since the early 2000s, with several
diaspora outreach programs unveiled and
expatriates’ rights expanded (Delano, 2011).
The changes have garnered attention from
governments in Latin America and beyond
that look to Mexico as a model for diaspora
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policies (Delano, 2014). It is in this context
of ascendant optimism and technocratic
policy convergence that we examine Mexico’s 3×1 Program, analyzing its mobilization
and replication within Mexico and discussing
its implications more broadly. This concrete
case study helps us contextualize and make
sense of the spread of diaspora development
policies.

& Fortuny, 2010; Iglesias, 2011).
Migration is part of broader patterns of
change in Yucatán that have been driven by the
long-term decline of the traditional agricultural economy in the state’s rural areas (Carte
et al., 2010; Iglesias, 2011). One result has been
large-scale rural-to-urban migration to the
capital city of Mérida and to the emerging
tourist hub of Cancún in neighboring Quintana Roo (Cornelius et al., 2007). Eventually
a secondary trend emerged of international
migration from Yucatán to the United States.
Cornelius et al. (2007) note that Cancún often
serves as a sort of “migration school” where
rural and indigenous people gain experiences
and skills that make the option of migration
to the USA more visible and viable. The short
history of migration from Yucatán means
fewer people are able to draw on family or
other networks to obtain legal status in the
USA; a state official told us that an estimated
90 percent of Yucatecans currently in the
USA are undocumented. He estimated that
about 70 percent live in California, principally the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas,
with smaller clusters in Portland, Dallas, and
Denver (personal communication, January
25, 2016). Official data show that emigration
from Yucatán predominantly comes from
a southern cluster around Oxkutzcab and a
northern cluster around Cenotillo; meanwhile,
87 percent of the state’s municipalities are rated
as having very low international migration
intensity, as is the state as a whole (Zamora
Ramos & Gonzalez, 2014).¹

Migration from Mexico and Yucatán
Emigration from Mexico has traditionally
been dominated by individuals leaving rural
communities in the historic heartland of
west-central Mexico, particularly the states
of Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, and
Zacatecas and neighboring areas, and going
to principal destinations that include California, Texas, and Chicago (Massey et al.,
2003). Those patterns have diversified significantly in recent decades to include many
new origins and destinations (Zuñiga & Hernandez-Leon, 2005; Riosmena & Massey,
2012), including more migrants from urban
areas (Hernandez-Leon, 2008) and more
indigenous migrants (Klooster, 2013). The
southeastern region of Mexico is among
the most recent to make a substantial contribution to migration flows. This paper
focuses on the southeastern state of Yucatán,
where emigration has been limited and
recent by Mexican standards, but nonetheless has made a noticeable impact and has
increased rapidly since the 1990s (Cornelius
et al., 2007). As a new region of international
migration, the scholarly attention to migration from Yucatán is limited but growing The 3×1 Program
(e.g. Adler, 2004; Burke, 2004; Cornelius et The 3×1 Program traces its roots to inforal., 2007; Piacenti, 2009, 2012; Solís Lizama mal, localized community projects that
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migrants from Mexico’s historic migration analyses at the national scale, but qualitative
region have been undertaking since at least and case study research has been limited to
the 1970s. Piecemeal government support the experiences of pioneering migrant orgadates from the 1980s, coalescing in 1992 with nizations and examples from states in the
formalization of the precursor 2x1 matching historic migration heartland (e.g. Fernandez
program in Zacatecas, and expansion nation- et al., 2006; Garcia Zamora, 2007; Iskander,
wide in 2002 with the institutionalization of 2010; Bada, 2014).³ The limited engagement
the federal 3×1 Program (Fernandez et al., with nontraditional contexts obscures the
2006; Garcia Zamora, 2007; Iskander, 2010). diversifying range of experiences within the
Annual investments through the 3×1 Program, 3×1 Program. The program has been widely
including collective remittance contributions adopted in the fifteen years since it was instiby HTAs and the triple government match, tutionalized nationwide, with more than half
grew from an initial total of Mex$400 million (54 percent) of all municipalities in Mexico
in 2002 to Mex$1.5 billion in 2014, the latest completing at least one project and all but
year for which full records were available.²
two states participating. The portion of the
Research on the program has docu- program budget absorbed by the four leadmented improvements in infrastructure ing states (Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán,
and provision of public goods in beneficiary and Zacatecas) decreased from 70 percent
communities (Orozco & Lapointe, 2004; over the first five years to 40 percent by
Duquette-Rury, 2014), and diversification of 2014.⁴ A survey of Mexican HTAs found that
public investment away from municipal seats three-quarters had been founded since 2002,
and toward rural areas (Burgess, 2005; Fox & the year the 3×1 Program was established,
Bada, 2008). Authors have also emphasized and that many new clubs form at the invithat migrants’ financial stake can enable them tation of municipal presidents specifically
to check the power of traditional elites and to participate in the program (Duquettepressure government actors for transpar- Rury & Bada, 2013; also see Goldring, 2004).
ency and efficient use of program resources Research on the 3×1 Program needs to be
(Bakker, 2007; Garcia Zamora, 2007) — a expanded beyond the pioneering cases to
point we will discuss in more detail later. capture more experiences. This paper conEvaluations have not been entirely posi- tributes to the task by focusing on the new
tive, however, as studies also have revealed emigration region of Yucatán.
patterns of partisan manipulation to direct
Despite being latecomers to international
matching funds toward party strongholds or migration, Yucatecan communities have
to align project timing with election cycles engaged extensively with the 3×1 Program.
(Meseguer & Aparicio, 2012; Waddell, 2015; The first projects in the state were completed
Simpser et al., 2015).
in 2004, the program’s third year, with just five
The literature on the 3×1 Program, of the state’s one hundred six municipalities
briefly summarized in the previous para- participating. By 2014, eighty-seven municigraph, includes overviews and quantitative palities (82 percent) had participated in 3×1,
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completing an average of five projects each
over ten years. Yucatán’s total 3×1 Program
expenditures of Mex$390 million since the
federal program began rank eleventh highest
out of thirty-two states —a remarkable statistic for a state that consistently ranks among
the lowest in migration intensity. Yucatán’s
higher migration municipalities are the most
active in the program, but the majority of the
participating municipalities are classified as
low or very low migration intensity. This mix
of nontraditional characteristics and strong
program participation bolsters our position
that research on 3×1 must extend beyond
the pioneering examples from the high-migration heartland region. Our goal in this
paper is to analyze how this federal program
to support and encourage diaspora contributions has been adapted in the distinct context
of Yucatán. Examining replications of 3×1
in new contexts allows us to examine the
policy’s positioning as a model, analyze the
importance of context for replications, and
discuss implications for the general ideas of
diaspora development.

but instead are shaped by the ideological and
methodological orientations of networks of
experts with the power to designate success
and failure (Prince, 2012; McCann & Ward,
2015). Peck & Theodore (2015) emphasize
the interplay of evaluation and marketing
in the technocratic positioning of policies
as best practices with salience beyond their
place of origin. The packaging and marketing
of policies renders them as myths — decontextualized and functionally polyvalent, able
to interface with and legitimize varied practices and existing ideas, rather than specify
or dictate a uniform program (Lieto, 2015).
Reflecting on the development industry,
Mosse (2005, p.14) comes to a similar conclusion, that “policy primarily functions…to
legitimize rather than to orientate practice.”
A second focus of policy mobilities
research is the importance of place and context, both for assessing the extent to which
policies reflect the contexts from which they
emerge and for analyzing the regrounding
of mobilized policies in diverse contexts.
Policies are assembled in places, absorbing
local influences together with more diffuse
Policy Mobilities Approach
elements, but mobilization is often partial,
Our analysis of the replication of the 3×1 with only some parts of the model moving
Program outside of its original contexts is (McCann & Ward, 2015). Again, power is
grounded in the emerging policy mobilities central both in the mobilization of policy and
theoretical framework. This framework takes in its uneven reproduction in new contexts.
a critical approach to policy, focusing on These insights become particularly important
questions of power to understand how poli- as policymaking is increasingly globalized
cies emerge and spread, the effects they have, and decisions reflect influences and expertise
and the ways people and groups interact with from diverse contexts.
policy (Shore et al., 2011; McCann & Ward,
We apply the policy mobilities approach
2012). A key starting point is the problema- first by examining the importance of context
tization of the idea of best practices. Success in the emergence of the 3×1 Program and
and failure are not objectively determined, the creation of a legitimizing policy myth,
145

Journal of Latin American Geography

and then by examining how the model is around Mexico. Other studies of policy
regrounded in distinctive new contexts. mobilities in Latin America similarly note
We recognize that because policy is pack- the importance of national governments
aged and mobilized through abstractions (Delano, 2014; Jajamovich, 2016).
and incomplete histories and because it is
regrounded and renegotiated in each place,
we must consider the agency of a multiplicity Research Methodology
of actors and the substantial scope for varia- This research relies on interviews and field
tion and repurposing beyond what might be observations in the state of Yucatán, Mexico,
envisioned by the policy entrepreneurs and as well as analysis of national-scale adminisinstitutions that do much of the mobilizing. trative data from the 3×1 Program. The first
This is particularly true in the case of the 3×1 author conducted four weeks of field research
Program, which mandates the participation in Yucatán in early 2016, as well as in-person
of migrant organizations and all three levels and telephone interviews with USA-based
of Mexican government. We study “up, down, Yucatecan migrants.⁵ The research presented
and sideways” (Stryker & Gonzalez, 2014) here is part of his larger research project examto understand the complex power dynamics ining collective remittances and hometown
associations throughout Mexico, encomat play.
This study also contributes a new per- passing interviews and fieldwork in eight
spective within policy mobilities research. Mexican states and with associated migrant
The majority of work using this approach organizations across the USA, as well as
focuses on interurban or translocal mobili- interviews with World Bank and Inter-Amerties linking cities around the world. The key ican Development Bank officials who have
players in these accounts are urban officials worked on the topic. The second author
and the traveling policy experts, consultants, conducted survey research in Yucatán over
and organizations with whom they interact two months in 2008–2009 and conducted
(Temenos & McCann, 2013). The focus is interviews and field observations in 2012 and
urban and global, with national governments 2015. Each author conducted semi-structured
rarely factoring into these analyses (Lovell, interviews with federal, state, and munic2017). Our case study includes migrant and ipal officials as well as leaders of migrant
municipal policy entrepreneurs who more or hometown associations from Yucatán. Our
less fit the typical city-centric mold, but the analyses of 3×1 Program trends in Yucatán
example also shows that the Mexican federal and beyond are based on administrative
government has played a key mobilizing role. data for all projects completed nationwide
The federal government’s early engagement from 2002 to 2014, obtained from Mexico’s
helped solidify the fledgling program in the National Transparency Institute (INAI) at
original contexts and shaped its institution- www.infomex.org.mx.
The research specifically looked at seven
alization, which made the policy mobile
and introduced it in numerous new contexts Yucatán communities with completed 3×1
146
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Figure 1. Migration Intensity Index for Municipalities in Yucatán, 2010. Source: Map by author, data
from CONAPO (Consejo Nacional de Población).

projects. The study includes municipalities
ranging from very low to high international
migration intensity, as calculated by Mexico’s
population bureau, all of which have medium
or high levels of marginalization (Zamora
Ramos & Gonzalez, 2014).⁶ The municipalities range in population from 1,000 to 30,000.

Framing the 3×1 Program

From its earliest iterations, the 3×1 Program
and its informal precursors have been celebrated as groundbreaking examples of

migrant initiative and diaspora-led development. The air of perceived success was
solidified in part by a positive evaluation
commissioned by USAID (Orozco, 2003)
and by support from the World Bank
and Inter-American Development Bank
(Iskander, 2010). It also helped that the model
could be framed as a version of public-private
partnership, in line with dominant neoliberal
thinking at these international institutions
and within Mexico’s federal bureaucracy.
The standard discourse of the program emphasizes that it is a grassroots
147
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phenomenon; that migrants began organizing and completing projects on their own
and the government only got involved later.
This stylized origin story is epitomized by
frequent reference to the “0×1” era, when
migrants’ collective remittances were not
matched or supported by government
involvement. At that time, migrant organizations were completing public projects
to address unmet needs without any help
from the government. The cero por uno era is
indeed foundational for the 3×1 Program, and
it is true that government involvement came
as a response to the initial stimulus provided
by migrant groups. Yet the constant invocation of this grassroots origin story by both
migrants and government officials emphasizes only some elements of the program’s
origins, and has the potential to distract from
the important ways it has since evolved.
In contrast to the grassroots discourse,
academic analyses have produced more
nuanced interpretations that complicate the
narrative. Some of the most consequential
analyses to date of Mexican HTAs converge
on the conclusion that interactions with various levels of government have long played a
fundamental role in strengthening migrant
organizations and influencing the evolution
of the collective remittance phenomenon
(Goldring, 2002; Iskander, 2010; Bada, 2014).
These authors convincingly argue that the
evolution, growth, and solidification of the
extensive network of Mexican HTAs, and
the evolution of the associated 3×1 matching
program, would not have happened without
early engagement between migrant groups
and government actors that provided support and recognition to the fledgling groups.
148

The conclusions these authors draw stand
in sharp contrast to the myth-making that
centers grassroots as the defining characteristic of the 3×1 model. Rather than grassroots
migrants going it alone, Iskander (2010) documents a history of evolving and iterative
cooperation, coordination, and occasional
conflict between migrant organizations and
government actors in the pioneering Zacatecan example. She uses the term “interpretive
engagement” to describe the dense web of
interactions and relationships that she identifies as the most important factor in the
evolution of a strong and functional program
in Zacatecas — the basis for the creation of
a federal program. She points to the interpretive engagement itself as the true best
practice to be emulated. Bada (2014) studied
Michoacano HTAs and emphasizes similar
relational processes as a key element. In both
cases, translocally successful approaches were
established not because grassroots migrant
organizations went it alone, but because they
participated in a productive learning process
together with government and community
actors. The types of engagement identified
as fundamental to early successes were not
necessarily replicated, however, as the institutionalization of the 3×1 Program packaged
and exported a mechanical formula or policy
model to be implemented with or without
substantial engagement and cooperation
(Iskander, 2015). We will return to this point
in our discussion of the Yucatecan case.
Our purpose in critically analyzing the
discourse of grassroots origins is not to minimize or discount the truly impressive efforts
of migrants and migrant organizations, but
rather to assess how the policy was assembled
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and mobilized, identify gaps in the origin policy brands in Temenos & McCann, 2013).
myth, and consider the importance of the Even within Mexico, Zacatecas stands out as
original context. The long history of emigra- a high migration area and has become inextion from the historic heartland region, its tricably linked to the 3×1 Program and ideas
extensive networks of migrants abroad, and of migrant-led development. The pioneering
a particular focus on local ties all contributed Zacatecan case is fundamental to the brandto a strong pattern of hometown association ing and mythologizing of the program, both
formation (Portes et al., 2007). “The migrant” as a success and as a grassroots, migrant-led
became a figure associated with development model. In interviews, federal officials and
and progress; migrants and migrant organiza- officials in other states nearly always refertions were accorded status and legitimacy as enced the Zacatecan case in positioning and
social and political actors (Smith & Bakker, justifying the program’s replication in new
2008; Iskander, 2010). Migrants and migrant contexts. Zacatecas takes on the status of a
organizations have gained a higher profile in brand, standing in for the pioneering expeZacatecas than perhaps any other state, befit- riences across the historic migration region
ting the area’s migration history. In Zacatecas, that were central in the model’s emergence.
half of all municipalities are classified as very
As noted earlier, the empirical focus of this
high or high migration intensity (Zamora paper will be on the replication of the 3×1
Ramos & Gonzalez, 2014). In Guanajuato Program in the nontraditional origin state of
the figure is 39 percent and in Michoacan Yucatán. The state presents a starkly different
it’s 35 percent (in Yucatán just 2 percent are context from the historic migration region,
high or very high migration intensity). The yet institutionalization of the program at the
emergence of the 3×1 Program was heavily national level allowed the model to be repliinfluenced by this historic heartland context cated and regrounded there. We document
and was intertwined with the rise to promi- the results of the 3×1 Program in Yucatán and
nence of migrants and migrant organizations. compare them to the pioneering examples,
The pioneering examples from the his- using a policy mobilities framework.
toric heartland region are important not only
as the contexts in which the 3×1 Program
emerged, but also as the cases that serve as Regrounding the 3×1
points of reference and legitimization for Program in Yucatán
the model. Migrants from a few pioneering
states engage in lighthearted debates about Hurricane Isidore and the Beginnings of
who should get credit for instigating the 3×1 in Yucatán
first precursor projects that led to the cre- The first hometown associations representing
ation of 3×1, but in most accounts Zacatecan Yucatán organized in response to Hurricane
migrant groups have become the face of Isidore, which struck the peninsula in 2002,
the program — the pioneering “brand” of causing extensive damage. Interviewed by
collective remittances (see the discussion of phone in September 2016, the leader of the
149
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first Yucatecan HTA to join the 3×1 Pro- representing Yucatecan communities
gram noted that after the hurricane, many organized, researched the 3×1 Program, estabpeople wanted to do something to help. lished contact with officials back home, and
There had been a growing number of people began submitting projects. The first projects
from the same hometown living in the Los were approved during the 2004 funding cycle,
Angeles area, but they were not in regular with Mex$1.1 million in migrant contribucontact. Responding to the hurricane was tions and Mex$4.4 million total expenditure
the first time they were motivated to organize. in Yucatán for the kindergarten, a senior
They coalesced as a group and raised funds center, residential water service, church renthrough raffles and small events, and donated ovations, and two ambulances. The program
it directly to needy, hurricane-affected fami- caught on quickly in Yucatán, expanding to
lies in their Yucatecan hometown.
eighteen projects with Mex$2.2 million in
The process of organizing relief donations migrant contributions in 2005, and twenbrought the group into contact with other ty-three projects with Mex$4.5 million in
Yucatecan migrants and laid the foundation migrant contributions in 2006.⁷ Migrant
for further organizing. They also began to leaders and government officials uniformly
establish links with existing Mexican migrant reported in interviews that 3×1 projects in
groups in the Los Angeles area, including Yucatán during these early years were iniZacatecan and Michoacano hometown asso- tiated and funded by the nascent migrant
ciations, which introduced them to the 3×1 organizations, with government officials
Program that had just been formalized and playing a supporting role.
expanded nationwide that year. Upon learnThe direction of early Yucatecan homeing of the matching grant program, the young town associations was shaped by the
Yucatecan groups reoriented their efforts to nontraditional origin context of Yucatán, as
work within the program. The club leader migrants were organizing for the first time
recounted:
and working to forge new connections with
one another and with their origin commuThere had not been any [3×1] projects nity governments. Yucatán’s low migration
yet in Yucatán. . . . I explained [to the intensity meant they had smaller commugroup] that the program could be a big nities of hometown emigres from which to
benefit for Yucatecan communities. If draw. The shorter history and lower intensity
we put in a dollar, the others [three of migration also meant that migrants did
levels of government] put in the same. not have the same status and visibility in the
To get the program going, I talked to origin communities as do their counterparts
my group and we did the first project, from the historic migration region. These
rehabilitating a kindergarten (personal differences are important as we analyze the
communication, September 21, 2016).
replication of the 3×1 program in this new
context.
A handful of hometown associations
However, in addition to the nontraditional
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origin context, the Yucatecan HTAs were in Yucatán closely approximated the pioalso influenced by the traditional destina- neering examples, but within a few years
tion of Los Angeles and the mentoring of the story diverged from this auspicious start.
established HTAs. A Yucatecan migrant The grassroots variety of 3×1 in Yucatán was
leader we interviewed said the Zacatecan supplanted by so-called simulation projects,
organizations in California were like big representing a significant mutation of the
brothers who passed along their knowledge model — as might be expected, given the
to the fledgling groups. Migrant leaders and substantial differences in context relative
officials from Zacatecas put on a 3×1 Pro- to the policy’s origins. Simulation projects,
gram workshop for new HTAs from other most commonly referred to as aval projstates and took them on a tour of projects ects in Spanish,⁸ are initiated and funded by
in Zacatecas. Zacatecan HTA leaders also municipal governments, with migrant groups
visited Yucatán to help jump-start the pro- providing only their signature on the project
gram there. These influences fit the classic paperwork. The project is a simulation in the
policy mobilities model, as the program’s sense that HTA money and engagement exist
innovators promoted the model to prospec- only on paper, while in reality the munictive emulators and led study tours to show ipal government manages everything and
covers the migrant share of the cost. Given
successful examples.
The early experiences in Yucatán mirror the three-for-one matching structure, even
the pioneering model and the grassroots contributing its own share plus the intended
discourse of the program to a remarkable migrant organization share in a simulation
degree, despite notable differences in con- project, a municipal government can double
text. Summarizing, migrants living in the its money by capturing the state and federal
U.S. began organizing independently, then matching funds.
The economic recession of 2008 was an
found out about the 3×1 Program and
rechanneled their activity through it. Gov- important catalyst for the shift from slow
ernment actors were involved from an early growth driven by migrant initiative to a patstage, but their initial roles can reasonably tern of simulation projects with minimal
be characterized as reactive and supportive migrant involvement. Migrants’ incomes and
rather than driving the initiative. The policy financial security in the USA were battered
model that had been packaged and mobi- by the recession; household remittances,
lized was regrounded in Yucatán with little which often remain steady during recessions,
if any mutation. Early examples followed dropped in Yucatán by 20 percent from 2008
both the letter of the policy and the spirit to 2009.⁹ Yucatecan HTAs were no longer
able to fund projects in the same ways or
of the model.
to the same extent that they had before
Recession, Mutation, and “Simulation”
the recession. Paradoxically, the decreased
Projects
availability of migrant contributions opened
The earliest applications of the 3×1 Program the floodgates as municipalities shifted to
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Figure 2. Trends
in 3×1 Program
Activity in Yucatán
State, 2004 to
2010. Data source:
Instituto Nacional
de Transparencia,
Acceso a la
Información y
Protección de Datos
Personales (INAI).

simulation projects. The modest fundraising
capacity of the handful of new Yucatecan
HTAs had been the limiting factor for program growth, but with simulation projects
that was no longer the case. Municipal governments could submit as many projects as
they could fund, covering their own designated contribution and the intended migrant
part, as long as a migrant organization would
sign off on the paperwork. Mayors and even
entrepreneurial migrant “leaders” began
recruiting migrants to register new HTAs
specifically to enable simulation projects, in
some cases creating ghost clubs that exist
only on paper (Burgess, 2016).¹⁰
Simulation projects quickly became
the default approach in Yucatán. Speaking
frankly, migrant leaders and government
officials alike conceded that nearly all Yucatecan 3×1 projects in recent years have been
simulations (Gomez Hernandez, 2014 also
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noted this trend). One interviewee in California quipped that they would be surprised
if Yucatecan migrant groups put in even 1
percent of the 3×1 Program funds attributed
to them (personal communication, April 30,
2016).
Three trends in the program’s administrative data would be counter-intuitive during
a recession but make sense as evidence of a
shift to simulation projects, helping corroborate interviewees’ claims. First, as seen in
Figure 2, supposed migrant contributions to
the 3×1 Program in Yucatán ballooned from
Mex$4.5 million in 2006 to a peak of Mex$23
million in 2009, despite the recession—recall
that household remittances decreased during
this time. Second, the number of participating municipalities and HTAs increased
rapidly during the depths of the recession. In
addition, for the first time in 2009, individual
clubs began sponsoring projects in multiple
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municipalities and working with municipali- influence project selection, and about how to
ties other than their own—a notable anomaly deal with failed projects— through interprein a program premised on migrants working tive engagement and ongoing cooperation and
to benefit their communities of origin. The collaboration. In contrast, in Yucatán, the
shift to simulation projects allowed the 3×1 first major roadblock derailed engagement
Program to scale up in Yucatán —82 percent rather than deepening it. Shifting to simuof municipalities have benefited from at least lation projects might have been intended
one project — despite the economic reces- as a stopgap measure to keep the program
sion and despite the context of relatively afloat as HTA donations dried up during
limited and recent emigration.
the recession, but in the long run the change
Simulation projects are not unique to seems to have demonstrated to key governYucatán, but the prevalence of the pattern ment actors in Yucatán that the program
is noteworthy. Simulations have been iden- could run without HTA contributions or
tified in numerous contexts, including in substantial migrant involvement. Instead
pioneering areas and dating back to the early of migrants and officials working through
years of the official program (e.g. Valenzu- the setback iteratively and collaboratively,
ela, 2006; Villela, 2014; Burgess, 2016). The the existence of a fully formed policy with
key distinction is that in most contexts sim- a dedicated funding stream opened the
ulation projects account for a fraction of door for officials to manage the program as
program activity and are often vigorously they would any other and step away from
challenged by established migrant organiza- the difficulty and limitations of partnering
tions. Our conclusion is that Yucatán’s nearly with migrant organizations. The migrant
complete reliance on simulation projects is groups, meanwhile, did not have the organot a difference of kind but rather of degree. nizational strength nor the political clout
The program mutated over time in Yucatán to challenge this shift — even the oldest of
to mainstream and normalize a practice that Yucatecan HTAs had existed just five years
existed in the original contexts but was mar- when the recession began. Thus, the practices of interpretive engagement failed to
ginal and contested.
We argue that the 2008 recession was materialize and government officials were
a decisive moment and the response to it centered while migrants were relegated to
crystallized the simulation mutation. The the margins. Despite initially appearing to be
recession was the first major obstacle in a close replica of the pioneering model, the
Yucatán’s replication of the 3×1 Program. In 3×1 Program in Yucatán was diverted at this
the pioneering cases, Iskander (2010) and key juncture and went to scale as a simulation
others highlighted how migrants and officials model. We argue that this mutation toward
worked through problems and breakdowns simulation projects opened the door for
along the way — including debates about customary practices of clientelism and corwhat constitutes a legitimate migrant orga- ruption to gain a foothold in the 3×1 Program,
nization, about how much the state should outlined in the following section, contrary to
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expectations of increased transparency and
pressure for good governance.
Why did the policy mutate so significantly
in Yucatán, despite the early parallels in organizing and migrant initiative? Context is a
central factor. The policy model emerged in
the distinctive context of the migration heartland, with its sustained history of intensive
migration and extensive migrant organizing,
and the outcomes the policy boosters have
encouraged everyone to expect are derived
from that unique example. The contextual
factors in Yucatán are very different. The
state has emerged as a new emigration area,
but the intensity of migration remains very
low relative to other parts of Mexico. The
short history also means migration networks
are less established, which contributes to
the high incidence of undocumented status
among Yucatecan migrants, in turn fostering
a culture of secrecy around migration. These
factors help account for the much lower
profile and limited power of migrants and
migrant organizations in Yucatán. In contrast
to Zacatecas and the pioneering contexts
where HTAs have become powerful actors
who work to advance their own agendas, in
Yucatán’s less-than-extreme migration context, the lower visibility and power of migrant
groups left them unable to resist coopting of
the model.¹¹

Grassroots Democracy to Elite
Corruption
The Yucatán case presents a cautionary
tale that good governance effects often
associated with the 3×1 Program and transnational migrant organizing cannot be taken
for granted. Previous research has been
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optimistic about the transformative power
of migrant organizing, engaged transnational
citizens, and collective remittances (e.g. Burgess, 2005; Moctezuma, 2011). Hometown
associations are seen as venues for political
and civil action that cultivate transnational
solidarity by engaging community members as well as local, state, and national
governments to address community needs
and, ideally, herald a new period of political
transparency and responsiveness (Orozco &
Lapointe, 2004; Garcia Zamora, 2007; Smyth,
2017). The 3×1 Program is assumed to nurture
and support these trends, despite being a
government program, because it is portrayed
as independent and grassroots.
Discussions linking migrant-led development to good governance and transparency
agendas begin from an assumption, either
explicit or implicit, that the baseline is a
state of bad governance. In Mexico broadly,
there is a long and pernicious history of
clientelism (Fox, 1994; Seffer, 2015) and
corruption (Morris, 1999; Warf & Stewart, 2016). The country’s much discussed
democratic transition has not eradicated
these patterns; as some types of corruption
and clientelism diminish, new forms have
emerged (Seffer, 2015). Even within Mexico,
the state of Yucatán stands out for its pervasive and entrenched systems of political
and economic control that have remained
largely unchecked since the colonial and
hacienda eras (Goodman, 1974). Goodman
(1974, p.150) remarked on the ubiquitous
corruption, noting that “everyone in the state,
from the highest government officials, to the
richest merchants, to the lowest peasants, is
fully aware of this.”
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Although migrant organizations have
been discussed as a countervailing force with
the potential to upend historic patterns of
corruption and elite power, we have not
always found that to be the case in Yucatán.
The examples in the following paragraphs
highlight problems that emerged from the
regrounding of the 3×1 Program in this particular context, and that also reflect on the
program’s structure. In sharp contrast to the
association between diaspora development
and good governance, these examples illustrate how the 3×1 Program can become a
medium for new corruption to flourish or old
corruption to evolve.
As discussed earlier, the transition to simulation projects that cut out the participation
and leadership of migrants underscores the
(de)evolution of the 3×1 Program policy.
Within the Yucatecan case, the migrant as
the true motor and origin of the hometown
association has become a myth. For example,
discussing a Portland, Oregon, organization
that is considered one of the most successful Yucatecan HTAs, a Yucatán state official
admitted that it was the municipal president
who initiated the formation of the HTA. The
migrants who comprise the organization had
to be convinced by state and local officials to
go along with the arrangement. The official
related:
We asked them to see it as an opportunity to help improve their community.
We also told them that if we did not
do it [form an HTA and participate in
3×1] in their community, we would do
it in some other municipality anyway
because it was a resource the federal

government had given and we had to
make use of it. That is how we got this
group involved (personal communication, December 11, 2012).
The state official’s comment highlights an
unintended consequence of institutionalizing the 3×1 Program: Officials began to see
it as money that would be left on the table
if they did not find a way to claim it. This
perspective reinforced the growth of simulation projects, and, as noted in the quote,
was often convincing to migrants. Even if
they could not follow the intended model of
the program by initiating and funding their
own projects, migrants could help out their
hometowns by going along with municipal
governments’ schemes to qualify for the
funds.
Beyond simulation projects and ghost
organizations, signs of corruption and clientelism are clear in the 3×1 Program in Yucatán.
Migrant leaders allege that government officials now routinely collude with contractors
to receive kickbacks. One complained, “I love
this program but it makes me sick and gives
me a headache because I have to deal with
these crooks,” later adding, “At this point they
could rename the program instead of ‘Program 3×1 for Migrants’ to ‘Program 3×1 for
Contractors and Government Employees’”
(personal communication, April 25, 2016).
Project budgets are inflated and materials
and workmanship are shortchanged to maximize profits and graft, often at the expense of
project quality. Unfortunately, in Yucatán the
allegations of corruption extend beyond the
usual suspects. One migrant leader accused
other migrants of “learning” from the way
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government officials take advantage of the the partnership of the state and federal govprogram and beginning to demand pay- ernments with migrants could also be seen
ments from mayors in exchange for signing as perpetuating the status quo (Itzigsohn,
off for simulation projects—effectively using 2000). Although many examples exist of
the HTAs they control to sell access to the hometown associations catalyzing positive
program.
changes in their communities of origin, our
The story of a hometown association experiences in Yucatán demonstrate that
project in one of our research communities is not always the case. We found that the
illustrates the role political and economic cor- presence of simulation projects and the forruption plays. The impetus for the creation mation of ghost HTAs specifically to facilitate
of this hometown association came from simulations often went hand in hand with
a member of the community’s economic corruption and clientelism in the execution
elite in Mexico. He personally flew to the of projects. In these examples, a program
USA to meet with emigrants from his town designed to empower diasporas and support
and educated them on the matching funds their engagement was captured by local offiavailable via the 3×1 Program. After officially cials and existing elites to pursue their own
establishing an HTA and deciding together interests, rather than challenging the status
with the migrants that a much-needed health quo or promoting good governance.
clinic would be the first project, he used his
political influence to make sure his wife was
hired as the designing architect and her fam- Conclusion
ily’s construction business got the contract The pioneering examples of the 3×1 Program
to supply materials and manage construction. from Zacatecas and the historic heartland
Community members routinely commented region are used to brand the policy model
on the profit these local elites made by ensur- and legitimize its expansion. However, as we
ing the projects were channeled through their have shown, replication of the program in
own family businesses and their self-interest new contexts will not always recreate those
in facilitating the formation of a hometown perceived successes. The model assumes
strong and respected migrant organizations
association.
It is worthwhile to question whether the that are treated as full partners alongside govtransnational economic and political activ- ernment actors — an assumption based on
ities by migrants actually promote change. the context in which the program emerged.
Are migrants involved in altering the status In Yucatán, however, we found that the
quo of the political order, finding new forms expectations the program makes of migrant
of visibility and participation as transmi- groups were too much for the state’s fledggrants that they had not achieved prior to ling HTAs. Lacking the ability to operate as
migration? While HTAs can be seen as equals with government actors, the migrant
agents of change that usurp the power of organizations were displaced from any meanelites and long ingrained political machines, ingful role.
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The peripheral issue of simulation projects flawed and cannot succeed, but rather that
became a mainstream and normalized prac- it is not a foolproof model, impervious to
tice in Yucatán as municipal officials became context.
the true drivers of activity. They learned to
As this example of the expansion of the
manage the program like any other, in some 3×1 Program within Mexico demonstrates,
cases leading to corruption and graft of proj- strong and capable migrant organizations are
ect funds. This is an example of a policy being essential to the policy’s proper functioning.
mutated through its application in a new We join other researchers in critiquing the
context — a common outcome of mobiliza- Mexican federal government for focusing on
tion. It is not inevitable that mutations will be expansion of the 3×1 Program and formation
negative, but it is nearly certain that a policy of new HTAs with little concern for the
will function differently as it is regrounded in groups’ strength or capacity to participate
new contexts with different power structures. (Escala et al., 2011; Escala, 2014). Although
In this case, the most significant mutation we recognize that there are significant limitawas not the introduction of a new element, tions and potential drawbacks to government
but rather an amplification of a preexisting, efforts to strengthen HTAs, more could be
but previously marginal, problem.
done to facilitate and support migrants’ own
One interpretation of this example is that efforts at organizing. Escala et al. (2011, p.
the policy model has significant weaknesses, 66) conclude that “simply creating more
but that they did not become fully mani- organizations and asking them to take on
fest in the pioneering cases because of the more activities will probably not translate
uncommon strength, dedication, capacity, into better or more projects.” Our research
and political clout of the pioneering migrant confirms these fears, finding that the 3×1
organizations. Once the model was applied Program spurred the formation of numerin new contexts where migrants had not ous Yucatecan hometown associations, but
attained such power, the policy’s faults because these HTAs lacked capacity or instiemerged more clearly. This implies that it tutional strength, they were quickly pushed
is not the 3×1 Program model itself that was aside by municipal officials and marginalized
successful in the pioneering areas, but rather from their own program.
that strong migrant organizations (and their
government counterparts) succeeded, with
the program being a conduit for their activity. Notes
This mirrors Iskander’s (2010) conclusion ¹The migration index, calculated by Mexico’s
that the pattern of interpretive engagement is population bureau (CONAPO), includes
the best practice to be emulated, not the 3×1 data on remittances, emigration, circular
Program’s specific mechanics. This conclu- migration, and return migration.
sion should serve as a cautionary example for ²The exchange rate for Mexican pesos to U.S.
other governments considering replicating dollars was approximately Mex$10 to US$1
the 3×1 Program: Not that it is fundamentally from 2002 to 2008. From 2009 to 2014 it
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fluctuated around Mex$14 to US$1.
³Exceptions include studies in Hidalgo and
Oaxaca (Fernández et al., 2006), Yucatán
(Gomez Hernandez, 2014), and an unidentified “central” state (Smyth, 2017).
⁴Authors’ calculations, based on administrative data obtained from Mexico’s National
Transparency Institute (INAI) at www.infomex.org.mx.
⁵The first author received funding for this
research from the University of Colorado’s
Geography Department, Center to Advance
Research and Teaching in the Social Sciences,
and from the Tinker Foundation via Colorado’s Latin American Studies Center. The
second author received funding from the
Fulbright Hays Faculty Research Award as
well as Bucknell University.
⁶The marginalization index includes data
on education, housing quality, rurality, and
income.
⁷The migrant share of a project budget is
generally one-fourth of the total expenditure, due to the 3×1 matching structure, but
in Yucatán the state government declined
to contribute or only contributed to a few
projects in 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2014, creating
a functional 2x1 match. Migrant share data

are presented instead of total expenditure to
allow easy comparison between years with
3×1 and 2x1 matching structures and to avoid
confusion.
⁸From the verb avalar, meaning to endorse
or cosign, proyectos de aval are ones in which
an HTA signs the necessary documents to
submit a project but does not contribute
funds. The 3×1 Program head at Sedesol mentioned in an interview that his central office
staff refers to the projects as simulaciones, and
we adopted the term because of its better
translation to English (personal communication, April 22, 2016).
⁹Remittance data from Banco de Mexico,
http://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet.
¹⁰Only HTAs registered with the Mexican
government or authorized by an existing
HTA federation may sponsor 3×1 projects.
A club must be made up of at least ten adult
members living outside of Mexico.
¹¹We make this comment with some ambivalence, as even within the community of
Yucatecan migrant organizations, frustration
with the simulation model and resistance
against it is not uniform, with some individuals taking a more opportunistic approach, as
we discuss later.
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